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THE CHANGING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND POLITICAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPAN’S AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
Nokyo, the system of agricultural cooperatives in Japan, is one of the most politically
powerful organisations in Japanese politics. It is a mammoth economic entity that provides
almost every kind of service to rural areas. Nokyo’s economic performance has never been
properly analysed because of the complexity of its business statistics. This paper fills this
gap by compiling data on Nokyo’s economic activities over the past three decades. It finds
that the mid-1990s was a turning point for Nokyo. Nokyo’s strength had been based on its
privileged position in financial services, creating stability in its operations in the 1970s and
1980s. In the mid-1990s, as fierce competition began in Japan’s financial markets, Nokyo’s
existence became less secure.
Introduction
The system of agricultural cooperatives known as Nokyo plays a pivotal role in the structure
and economics of Japan’s agricultural sector. Although there is no legal requirement to join
Nokyo, all Japanese farmers belong to the organisation. Nokyo has a hierarchical, nationwide
network. It has strong ties with the Liberal Democratic Party, which has been in government
for almost the entire postwar period. For its support of the LDP at election time, Nokyo has been
able to ensure that farmers’ interests are protected.
Nokyo is a mammoth economic entity. It not only provides services to farmers, for
instance supplying farm inputs and distributing agricultural products, but sells daily neces-
sities in rural areas. The organisation is also an important source of employment in rural areas.
Information on Nokyo’s business performance, for instance on its market share, has been
very limited. This has meant that analysts have not known the extent of Nokyo’s influence in
domestic markets. Some presume that Nokyo still exercises a great deal of monopolistic power
and prevents free competition. Others believe that Nokyo’s overly bureaucratic and conserva-
tive business style has seriously reduced its economic strength. Most of the analysis has been
based on observation rather than on strong statistical evidence.
The lack of data on Nokyo can largely be attributed to the complexity of Nokyo’s statistics
on its activities.1  There is some useful information on economic performance, but it uses
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formulas and terminology particular to Nokyo, and the methodologies and categories some-
times change. Because of these difficulties, even Japanese researchers do not have a very good
understanding of Nokyo’s business performance.
This paper closely examines Nokyo’s statistics and provides consistent data for the first
time on Nokyo’s business performance, particularly its market share. The data are used to
answer four questions: (1) how significant is Nokyo’s economic presence and how has its
economic power changed over the past three decades; (2) what has Nokyo’s business strategy
been; (3) how has Nokyo’s economic power affected its political activities; and (4) what are the
organisation’s prospects?
The Nokyo system
A review of the political dynamics among farmers, politicians, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and Nokyo is crucial to an understanding of how Nokyo works.
In common with most East Asian countries before World War II, Japan was predomin-
antly agricultural. Small-scale farming dominated, with farms being on average 1.0 hectares
in size, and rice was the main crop.2  Rural society was remarkably stable. For example, the
number of workers in agriculture remained fairly constant at around 15 million from the early
Meiji period to the start of World War II (Yamada 1991).
The rural sector has several characteristics that increase its attractiveness to politicians.
Farming communities are close and stable. Many families have farmed the same land for
generations and have strong ties with each other. The need to share irrigation water means
that farmers are used to cooperating on issues where they have common interests. And, most
importantly, the number of registered voters per member of the Diet (Japan’s parliament) is
small in rural areas and large in urban areas. This imbalance has increased the power of the
rural sector.3
It has therefore been in the interests of politicians to maintain the structure of the rural
community and the support of farmers. This has been the LDP’s main strategy for being elected
to office over the postwar period. Politicians have used various preferential policies to help
small farming communities stay in farming.
The collusion between politicians and farming communities benefits the administrative
organs of agricultural policy, particularly the MAFF, that seek to maintain their personnel and
budget.4  Even opposition parties have been sympathetic to the rural community. Zen-norin,
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the labour union of MAFF officials, has been the major supporter of the Japan Socialist Party,
the largest opposition party from 1955 to 1993.5
In terms of productivity, small-scale farming became unprofitable in the second half of
the 1950s when the economy entered its high-growth period. With the development of new
machinery and agricultural chemicals, large-scale farming became far more profitable than
small-scale farming. Around 1960 the most efficient farm size was estimated to be 2.5 hectares,
but the size of farms had hardly changed since the war.6  Technology continued to improve, and
in the 1990s the MAFF estimated that the most efficient farm size had increased to between
10 hectares and 20 hectares. If markets for renting and purchasing farmland had been
functioning, large-scale farming operations would have pushed out smaller operations.7
Small-scale farming is still dominant in Japan today. According to the 1995 Census of
Agriculture, those farming on less than 1.5 hectares share more than 50 per cent of Japan’s
farmland and those on farms of less than 3 hectares share nearly 75 per cent of farmland.8  Most
farmers earn their main living from off-farm employment, and farm on weekends or during
other leisure time.
The MAFF’s support for small farming communities has been the main reason why
traditional farming has persisted. The MAFF has restricted the leasing and trading of
farmland to prevent the consolidation of farming.9  Huge subsidies given to Nokyo’s facilities
for joint use benefit smaller farmers because large operators usually have their own facilities.
The acreage-control program that is an inevitable consequence of the supported rice price also
prevents large-scale farming from emerging.10
It has been difficult, however, for the MAFF to hold back the consolidation of farming.
For example, the MAFF cannot check whether all tenancy contracts between farmers observe
its regulations.11  To maintain traditional farming, the MAFF relies on Nokyo to monitor
farmers’ behaviour. Nokyo not only lobbies politicians and provides services to farmers, but
observes and controls members’ activities both directly and indirectly, and resolves conflicting
interests among farmers.
Nokyo often functions as a de facto sub-governmental body that helps make policy and
enforce it. A typical example is the acreage-control program, the rice production cartel
organised by the government. The MAFF first sets a national target for the acreage that should
be diverted from rice planting, and then allocates this target among the cities, towns and
villages. In both setting and allocating the target, the MAFF considers Nokyo’s opinions. Nokyo
accomplishes the target acreage by drawing up farmland-use plans for these areas and
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observing whether rice farmers follow the plans. The acreage-control program is just one
example of Nokyo’s involvement in agricultural policy. Many MAFF policies would not have
been able to be executed without Nokyo’s help, and therefore the ministry does not introduce
policies without considering Nokyo’s reaction.
The political dynamics among Nokyo, farmers, politicians and the MAFF are summa-
rised in Figure 1. The traditional structure of the rural community has benefited these groups
at a cost to society overall. For example, the gap in the border price of agricultural products (the
difference between domestic and world prices) increased more sharply in Japan than in any
other industrialised country in the postwar period (Honma and Hayami 1991). Farmers, the
MAFF and politicians have needed to keep their true objectives from consumers. In the 1961
Agricultural Basic Law, the MAFF stated that the promotion of large-scale farming was its top
priority. The MAFF has always favoured small farming communities in policymaking and
policy enforcement, while simultaneously stating that the promotion of large-scale farming is
its ‘official’ objective. The MAFF’s policies are often so complex and dubious that consumers
Figure 1 Political dynamics among farmers, politicians, the MAFF and Nokyo
Promote interdependency
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(and other outsiders) have not been aware of the true goals and effects. Likewise, Nokyo’s
complexity has been a way of camouflaging its real functions.
The collusion among the MAFF, politicians, Nokyo and farmers has helped maintain
farm incomes. During rapid industrialisation in the 1950s and 1960s, the average income of
farm households fell behind that of urban households. As the government increased its
protection of farmers, the income gap diminished rapidly in the late 1960s (Figure 2). Since the
mid-1970s, when the period of rapid industrialisation came to an end, the average income of
farm households has been higher than that of urban households.
Characteristics of the Nokyo system
The Nokyo system has a three-tier structure (Figure 3). Unit cooperatives in the villages, towns
and cities make up the first level. The unit cooperatives are in direct contact with farm
households.12  Each unit cooperative has its own jurisdiction and the MAFF has stipulated that
jurisdictions should not overlap.13  Farmers are regular members of local unit cooperatives,
and non-farm residents can join as associate members if they express sympathy with the
Figure 2 Ratio of farm household to urban household per capita disposable
income
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Sources: MAFF, Statistical Research on the Farm Economy; Management and Coordination Agency,
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principles of the Nokyo movement. Both regular and associate members are able to use all the
unit cooperatives’ services,14  but only regular members can vote at the general meeting. The
president of a unit cooperative is elected from only among the regular members.
In the 1940s many of the unit cooperatives were organised along municipal borders.15
The number of municipalities decreased in the 1950s after the government promoted consoli-
dation among municipalities. The MAFF and Nokyo’s National Central Union have supported
mergers of unit cooperatives along similar lines because many were too small to be efficient.
However, unit cooperatives did not merge as fast as the municipalities – farmers preferred the
status quo unless they were convinced of the benefits of merging.
Figure 4 shows the structure of a unit cooperative. Cooperatives provide not only
agricultural services but almost every service related to daily life.16  Non-agricultural services
are provided for all local residents.17  Above the unit cooperatives are two tiers of agricultural
federations at the prefectural and national levels. The federations provide most of the same
services as the unit cooperatives, but for simplicity only three types of federation are depicted
in Figure 3, with all other federations grouped together. The prefectural federations belong to
and are supervised by the Prefectural Central Union, and the national federations belong to
and are supervised by the National Central Union. The National Central Union is Nokyo’s
political arm – it forms its political agenda in consultation with farmers, negotiates with the
LDP, organises demonstrations and participates in MAFF policymaking.
Much of Nokyo’s business has been heavily regulated and protected by the government
– not only the MAFF but also the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Nokyo has been given a monopoly
position in the collection of rice under the Food Control Law18  and in the sale of fertiliser and
farm machinery.19  The marketing of agricultural products and the sale of inputs were partially
deregulated in the 1980s and 1990s. However, because of the lack of statistical evidence,
researchers have been unable to decide whether this deregulation was sufficient to undermine
Nokyo’s monopolistic power.
Nokyo’s banking and insurance businesses have been the most heavily protected. The
MOF’s regulation of financial institutions, including Nokyo’s financial businesses, was so
heavy that Japanese financial institutions were often referred to as ‘armed convoys’.20  The
MOF’s permission was needed for such activities as the location of branches and the creation
of new financial instruments. At the same time, interest rates were maintained at below-
market levels and the entry of new financial institutions was restricted, which maintained the
profits of the existing market participants. Nokyo has been given particularly favourable
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treatment. For instance, cooperative banks were given more freedom than ordinary commer-
cial banks to set up branches, allowing Nokyo to build up profits by lending through the inter-
bank money market to city banks that faced a huge demand from large businesses for finance.
In addition, Nokyo’s term-deposit interest rate was allowed to be 0.1 percentage points higher
than the rate set by the commercial banks, which gave it a clear advantage in attracting
business.
Insurance has also been heavily regulated and protected by the MOF. Just as in the
banking sector, Nokyo has been allowed greater freedom to set premiums, giving it an
advantage over the private insurance companies (Saeki 1989: 264–8).
The unit cooperatives themselves have little ability to manage funds – they consign these
operations to the prefectural credit federations, the Norinchukin Bank, the prefectural mutual
insurance federations and the National Mutual Insurance Federation. As can be seen in
column 4 of Table 1, most of the deposits that unit cooperatives collect from households are
redeposited into the upper federations. The profit margin between the redeposit interest rate
and the deposit interest rate was high until the early 1990s (column 8 of Table 1). Unit
cooperatives have obtained stable profits from commission charges by placing insurance funds
into the prefectural mutual insurance federations and the National Mutual Insurance
Federation.
The presidents of unit cooperatives, who are respected farming leaders, are better
politicians than businesspeople. However, a lack of business experience is no great barrier
thanks to the privileges of the banking and insurance businesses. The president simply sets
a target amount of deposits and insurance policies, which all the staff work toward. An example
of such efforts is the ‘deposit promotion week’, when all the employees visit farmers to persuade
them to deposit money into Nokyo.
As Figure 5 shows, unit cooperatives became more and more dependent on the profits
from banking and insurance in the 1970s and 1980s. Ironically these two decades were when
the unit cooperatives expanded the scope of their activities under the slogan of ‘not only farming
but also rural living overall’.21  The unit cooperatives started up various new businesses such
as housing development companies and travel agencies in the 1970s and 1980s but, as Figure
5 shows, these new businesses were not particularly profitable. However, because unit
cooperatives were providing a wider variety of services and offered greater convenience, they
became more attractive to farmers. This helped the unit cooperatives attract new deposits and
10
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sell new insurance policies.22  In other words, the real purpose of these new activities was the
promotion of Nokyo’s financial services.
Because Nokyo’s scope of business is so wide, and because of its nationwide network and
privileged position in banking and insurance, other businesses find it difficult to compete with
the organisation. In addition, some of Nokyo’s businesses are subsidised by the MAFF, making
it even more difficult for private businesses to compete on the basis of price.
Because the president of a unit cooperative is elected by a majority of members, Nokyo
policies favour the larger body of traditional, small farmers rather than the smaller number
of more innovative, entrepreneurial farmers. Farmers find it difficult not to rely on Nokyo’s
services. Even those who are critical of Nokyo do not like to defy the organisation for fear of
retaliation from Nokyo and other farmers. The only resistance they can make is to reduce their
reliance on the organisation.
Nokyo’s power has been gradually declining since the mid-1990s, when it became
impossible for unit cooperatives to count on stable profits from their banking and insurance
businesses. As column 8 in Table 1 indicates, the profit margins from banking fell rapidly in
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Figure 5 Structure of Nokyo’s business profits (per cent)
Notes: 1 The data have a fiscal-year base (1 April to 31 March).
2 Agriculture includes forestry and fisheries.
Sources: The data on banking and insurance activities are from MAFF, Statistics on Agricultural
Cooperatives; the data on agriculture are from Economic Planning Agency, National Accounts.
Share of banking and insurance
activites in total profit (RHS)
Agriculture’s share in GDP (LHS)
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the 1990s. Although this coincided with the ‘jusen problem’ (the bad loans held by the
prefectural credit federations, which had lent heavily to the housing finance companies, the
jusen, in the late 1980s), the more fundamental reason for the reduction in profitability was
the government’s program of financial deregulation.23  In the early 1990s, the MOF started to
introduce greater competition into the financial sector and decided to let inefficient banking
and insurance institutions fail. Facing a harsher business environment, Nokyo started to cut
back its staff (Figure 6). In 1993, with the aim of streamlining Nokyo’s businesses, the National
Central Union implemented a plan to demolish the prefectural-level federations and change
to a two-tier structure.24  By 2000, 27 prefectural economic federations (there are 47 prefectures
in Japan) were merged into the National Federation and all the prefectural mutual insurance
federations were merged into the National Mutual Insurance Federation. Restructuring
through mergers is expected to increase. The consolidation of the smaller unit cooperatives also
sped up (Table 2).25
Notes: 1 From 1991 the number of farm households includes only commercial farm households and
therefore does not link with previous years.
Sources: The data on Nokyo employees are from MAFF, Statistics on Agricultural Cooperatives; the
data on the number of farm households are from MAFF, Census of Agriculture and Forestry,
Annual Sample of Agriculture.
Figure 6 The rise in Nokyo staff
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Nokyo’s market share
Since the 1970s many analysts and Nokyo executives have repeatedly argued that Nokyo’s
market share has been undermined by the increasing number of farmers who have been
leaving Nokyo and by the rise in competing entities such discount stores and commercial
banks.26  This theory of ‘Nokyo pessimism’ has been based on intuition rather than fact. Nokyo
has often been criticised for its overly bureaucratic and conservative business style. Many
researchers and Nokyo executives assume that this has what has been increasing the distance
between Nokyo and farmers.27  Yet there has been little evidence provided to support this
belief. This paper provides a long-awaited numerical analysis of Nokyo’s market shares in five
major businesses – the distribution of agricultural products, the sale of farm inputs (including
facilities for joint use), banking, insurance and retailing. The first two services are solely for
farm households and the other three are also used by non-farm households.
Distribution of agricultural products
A major service provided by unit cooperatives is the collection of agricultural products from
members for distribution to markets or other traders (usually through the prefectural
Table 2 Number of unit cooperatives compared with cities, towns and villages
Cities, Unit Annual compound
 towns and villages cooperatives percentage decrease
1950 10,414 13,314
1955 4,813 12,985 –0.5
1960 3,511 12,221 –1.2
1965 3,376 9,135 –5.7
1970 3,276 6,185 –7.5
1975 3,257 4,942 –4.4
1980 3,256 4,546 –1.7
1985 3,254 4,303 –1.1
1990 3,246 3,688 –3.0
1995 3,233 2,635 –6.5
2000 1,618 –9.3
Sources: MAFF, Statistics on the Number of Existing Agricultural Cooperatives; Management and
Coordination Agency, Population Census.
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federations and the National Federation). Up until 1994 the Food Control Law gave Nokyo the
monopoly over rice collection. In addition, joint-use facilities such as grain storage and
selection houses, most of which are heavily subsidised by the MAFF, give Nokyo a competitive
advantage in the handling of agricultural products.
Nokyo’s share of the agricultural distribution business is shown in column 7 of Table 3
and in Figure 7. Nokyo’s share rose until the mid-1980s and remained fairly steady after that.28
This evidence contradicts the popular view of ‘Nokyo pessimism’. Considering that Nokyo’s
share of the rice market, which it previously controlled, has been diminishing, it seems that
Nokyo’s distribution business has done very well.29
Although entrepreneurial, large-scale farm operations have become less reliant on
Nokyo’s services, inefficient, smaller operations, which are still in the majority, have become
more dependent on Nokyo as a collection agency. Because most of these farmers earn their
living mainly by off-farm employment and are retaining farmland in the expectation of future
capital gains when it is converted to other uses (Godo 2000), they prefer to rely on Nokyo rather
than market their goods themselves. Increasing resistance by the more innovative farmers
may be the reason why researchers and Nokyo executives are inclined to advance the theory
of ‘Nokyo pessimism’. The reality is that the majority of farmers are ensuring that Nokyo
maintains its dominant position in the handling of agricultural products.
Supply of inputs
Nokyo supplies inputs for farming such as agricultural chemicals, fertiliser, feed, tools and
equipment, and offers access to facilities such as crop dryers and storage. As can be seen in
Figure 7 and column 6 of Table 4, Nokyo’s share of the farm input market has been high over
the past 30 years. Charges for Nokyo facilities have increased dramatically (column 5). The
same force has been maintaining Nokyo’s position: most larger farm operations have their own
facilities, but smaller, less efficient farmers rely on Nokyo rather than trying to save money by
searching for more profitable ways of farming.
Banking
Nokyo’s banking business is aimed at all residents and not just farm households, so this paper
focuses on Nokyo’s share of the banking business of all households. Less data are available on
Nokyo’s share of farm banking business, but estimates are given in Table 5.
16
Pacific Economic Papers
Table 3 Nokyo’s share in distribution of agricultural products (billion yen; per
cent)
            Value of agricultural products Nokyo’s Share of
Total production Of which,        For self-consumption         For distribution share in rice in
rice For re- For home Total sales Distri- distribution agricultural
production consumption bution of agricultural production
through products
Nokyo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)–(3)–(4) (6) (7)=(6)/(5) (8)=(2)/(1)
1960 2,133 985 203 477 1,419 560 39.5 46.2
1961 2,374 1,004 217 518 1,598 706 44.2 42.3
1962 2,708 1,152 236 491 1,930 845 43.8 42.5
1963 2,849 1,221 246 491 2,058 918 44.6 42.9
1964 3,151 1,360 259 517 2,314 1,025 44.3 43.2
1965 3,474 1,457 263 580 2,595 1,242 47.9 41.9
1966 3,842 1,625 291 519 2,943 1,490 50.6 42.3
1967 4,461 1,993 332 537 3,480 1,903 54.7 44.7
1968 4,725 2,104 400 518 3,653 2,090 57.2 44.5
1969 5,039 2,053 442 575 3,940 2,131 54.1 40.8
1970 5,082 1,847 444 566 3,975 2,109 53.1 36.3
1971 5,004 1,644 442 499 3,951 2,042 51.7 32.9
1972 5,599 1,895 517 484 4,458 2,391 53.6 33.9
1973 6,717 2,235 581 598 5,375 3,018 56.2 33.3
1974 8,398 2,958 728 689 6,818 3,772 55.3 35.2
1975 9,866 3,608 798 726 8,142 4,517 55.5 36.6
1976 10,284 3,526 942 771 8,368 4,879 58.3 34.3
1977 11,251 4,080 1,055 665 9,264 5,317 57.4 36.3
1978 11,551 3,995 1,127 725 9,498 5,528 58.2 34.6
1979 11,794 3,779 1,192 633 9,749 5,759 59.1 32.0
1980 11,582 3,271 1,255 603 9,485 5,501 58.0 28.2
1981 12,140 3,506 1,333 626 9,960 5,605 56.3 28.9
1982 12,077 3,469 1,309 505 9,956 5,814 58.4 28.7
1983 12,405 3,540 1,314 574 10,268 6,069 59.1 28.5
1984 13,212 4,101 1,392 579 10,978 6,524 59.4 31.0
1985 13,409 4,000 1,368 614 11,195 6,696 59.8 29.8
1986 13,069 3,893 1,382 666 10,770 6,573 61.0 29.8
1987 12,186 3,402 1,404 618 9,976 6,204 62.2 27.9
1988 12,098 3,139 1,357 490 10,081 6,126 60.8 25.9
1989 12,680 3,349 1,420 452 10,601 6,221 58.7 26.4
1990 13,018 3,190 1,359 418 11,001 6,411 58.3 24.5
1991 13,049 3,018 1,291 485 11,102 6,349 57.2 23.1
1992 12,703 3,433 1,211 378 10,860 6,212 57.2 27.0
1993 12,014 2,966 1,254 478 10,168 5,934 58.4 24.7
1994 12,759 4,015 1,227 329 11,004 6,012 54.6 31.5
1995 11,838 3,312 1,237 273 10,148 5,905 58.2 28.0
1996 11,480 3,172 1,040 294 9,964 5,916 59.4 27.6
1997 11,101 2,889 1,063 298 9,588 5,708 59.5 26.0
Note: 1 Columns 1–5 are from MAFF (2000) Social Accounts for Agricultural and Agriculture-Related
Industries, FY1998.  Column 6 is from MAFF, Statistics on Agricultural Cooperatives. The
data have a fiscal-year base.
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Nokyo’s basic strategy is to collect deposits from residents and redeposit them in the
upper federations. As shown in column 7 of Table 5 and Figure 8, Nokyo’s share of bank deposits
was fairly stable till the mid-1990s, when it started to fall.30  Nokyo’s share of the outstanding
deposits of all households decreased by only 2.7 percentage points between 1970 and 1992. The
number of farm households and agriculture’s share in GDP declined sharply over this period,
so the decline in Nokyo’s business has not been particularly large. Although Nokyo has been
accused of being slow to introduce ATMs and automatic transfer facilities, it has compensated
for these disadvantages by using more traditional ways of collecting deposits (such as the
promotions week mentioned above). After 1992 Nokyo’s share of the banking market began to
rapidly decline, as depositors questioned the solvency of Nokyo’s credit federations and as the
loosening of MOF regulations gave depositors more choice.
In contrast to the enthusiastic promotion of its deposit facilities, Nokyo has not been
particularly concerned about defending its share of the personal loan market (column 9 in
Table 6 and Figure 8). Nokyo’s share of loans to both farm and non-farm households declined
rapidly until 1989. In the 1990s, when Japan was in the midst of financial crisis, Nokyo’s share
rose again because other financial institutions were extremely reluctant to make personal
loans. Because redepositing is its main priority, Nokyo has been less interested in lending.
Note: The data for distribution is taken from column 7 of Table 3;  and farm inputs from column 6
of
Table 4.
Figure 7 Nokyo’s shares of services to farm households (per cent)
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Table 4 Nokyo’s share in inputs puchased for farming (billion yen; per cent)
Total value Value of inputs               Nokyo’s share in value of
of inputs Self-         Purchased (including service charges)                farm inputs sold
purchased for supplied
farming                (of which, from Nokyo) Including Excluding
Sale Charges charges for charges for
of for joint-use joint-use joint-use
inputs facililties facilities facilities
(1) (2) (3)=(1)–(2) (4) (5) (6)=((4)+(5))/(3) (7)=(4)/(3)
1960 754 203 551 213 9 40.3 38.7
1961 908 217 691 266 10 39.9 38.5
1962 1,029 236 794 304 10 39.6 38.3
1963 1,107 246 862 350 11 41.9 40.6
1964 1,244 259 985 372 12 39.0 37.8
1965 1,438 263 1,176 434 15 38.2 36.9
1966 1,636 291 1,345 527 17 40.4 39.2
1967 1,818 332 1,485 594 22 41.4 40.0
1968 1,983 400 1,583 663 28 43.6 41.9
1969 2,218 442 1,776 726 34 42.8 40.9
1970 2,541 444 2,097 812 38 40.5 38.7
1971 2,614 442 2,173 873 36 41.9 40.2
1972 2,799 517 2,282 943 37 42.9 41.3
1973 3,435 581 2,854 1,260 42 45.6 44.2
1974 4,540 728 3,812 1,695 54 45.9 44.5
1975 5,407 798 4,609 1,796 70 40.5 39.0
1976 5,910 942 4,968 1,973 83 41.4 39.7
1977 6,534 1,055 5,479 2,133 96 40.7 38.9
1978 6,501 1,127 5,375 2,094 111 41.0 39.0
1979 6,696 1,192 5,504 2,243 132 43.1 40.8
1980 7,256 1,255 6,001 2,450 146 43.3 40.8
1981 7,129 1,333 5,795 2,502 158 45.9 43.2
1982 7,092 1,309 5,783 2,449 166 45.2 42.4
1983 7,252 1,314 5,938 2,494 167 44.8 42.0
1984 7,650 1,392 6,258 2,559 166 43.6 40.9
1985 7,624 1,368 6,256 2,511 182 43.0 40.1
1986 7,394 1,382 6,012 2,373 196 42.7 39.5
1987 6,861 1,404 5,457 2,233 199 44.6 40.9
1988 6,756 1,357 5,399 2,288 209 46.3 42.4
1989 6,939 1,420 5,518 2,171 213 43.2 39.3
1990 6,940 1,359 5,581 2,252 221 44.3 40.3
1991 7,143 1,291 5,853 2,289 229 43.0 39.1
1992 7,010 1,211 5,799 2,277 242 43.4 39.3
1993 6,786 1,254 5,533 2,218 235 44.3 40.1
1994 7,027 1,227 5,801 2,180 252 41.9 37.6
1995 6,949 1,237 5,712 2,117 266 41.7 37.1
1996 6,878 1,040 5,838 2,257 271 43.3 38.7
1997 6,882 1,063 5,819 2,051 270 39.9 35.2
Note: 1 Inputs include service charges and capital formation. However, automobiles and oil products
used for farming are not included in column 4 because of data unavailability. For this reason,
Nokyo’s shares in columns 6 and 7 are slightly too low.
Sources: Columns 1–3 are from MAFF (2000) Social Accounts for Agriculture and Agriculture-Related
Industry; columns 4 and 5 are from MAFF, Statistics on Agricultural Cooperatives.
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Note: The data for deposits is taken from column 7 of Table 5; loans from column 9 of Table 6;
insurance from the second column of Table 7; and retailing from the last column of Table 8.
Figure 8 Nokyo’s market shares, all households (per cent)
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Insurance
Nokyo’s insurance business is also aimed at all residents. Because of data limitations, this
paper only estimates Nokyo’s share of the personal life insurance and personal annuity
business of a market made up of three types of insurance institutions – commercial life
insurance companies, postal life insurance and Nokyo.31
It is difficult to measure the volume of insurance services. This paper uses two methods:
the total premium paid by households in a fiscal year, and the total of liability reserves and
policyholders’ reserves held by Nokyo and other institutions at the end of the fiscal year.32
Owing to the lack of data, Nokyo’s share of farm household insurance cannot be estimated
separately.
The two measures (premium and reserve) reveal similar results on Nokyo’s market share
(Table 7). Nokyo’s share of the insurance market gradually increased until the late 1970s, and
then levelled off before declining in the second half of the 1980s, remaining fairly constant
thereafter. In the second half of the 1980s, the MOF approved a new type of life insurance
(which allowed the premium to be paid in a lump sum). This new type of insurance was sold
enthusiastically by commercial life insurance companies, causing a boom in life insurance.
Less keen to sell this type of insurance for fear of losing money from its deposit accounts, Nokyo
20
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N
ot
es
:
1
D
at
a 
fo
r 
19
73
–9
9 
ta
ke
n
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 t
h
e 
fi
sc
al
 y
ea
r;
 a
n
d 
fo
r 
19
70
–7
2 
at
 t
h
e 
en
d 
of
 t
h
e 
ca
le
n
da
r 
ye
ar
.
2
D
at
a 
fr
om
 M
A
F
F
, S
oc
ia
l A
cc
ou
n
ts
 fo
r 
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
ra
l a
n
d
 A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
-R
el
at
ed
  I
n
d
u
st
ri
es
 fr
om
 t
h
e 
F
Y
 1
99
8 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n
 fo
r 
co
lu
m
n
 1
, a
n
d
fr
om
 t
h
e 
F
Y
 1
99
3 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n
 fo
r 
co
lu
m
n
 2
. T
h
er
e 
ar
e 
in
co
n
si
st
en
ci
es
 fr
om
 F
Y
19
94
 o
n
w
ar
d 
in
 t
h
e 
da
ta
 o
n
 fi
n
an
ci
al
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
li
ab
il
it
ie
s
(s
ee
 G
od
o 
19
98
: 3
4–
9)
, w
h
ic
h
 is
 w
h
y 
th
e 
F
Y
19
93
 is
su
e 
(n
ot
 t
h
e 
la
te
st
 is
su
e)
 w
as
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
co
lu
m
n
 2
. D
at
a 
fo
r 
co
lu
m
n
 1
 w
il
l b
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e
in
 f
or
th
co
m
in
g 
is
su
es
 o
f 
th
is
 p
u
bl
ic
at
io
n
.
3
C
ol
u
m
n
 5
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 ip
pa
n
 c
h
ok
in
 (p
ri
va
te
 d
ep
os
it
s)
 in
 N
or
in
ch
u
ki
n
 R
es
ea
rc
h
 In
st
it
u
te
, F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
of
 A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
, F
or
es
tr
y
an
d
 F
is
h
er
ie
s 
in
 J
ap
an
.  
T
ot
al
 d
ep
os
it
s 
of
 t
ot
al
 h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
 (5
 +
 6
) i
s 
fr
om
 E
co
n
om
ic
 P
la
n
n
in
g 
A
ge
n
cy
 (1
99
1)
 R
ep
or
t o
n
 R
ev
is
ed
 N
at
io
n
al
A
cc
ou
n
ts
 o
n
 th
e 
B
as
is
 o
f 1
98
5 
fo
r 
19
70
–7
2;
 B
an
k 
of
 J
ap
an
, E
co
n
om
ic
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
A
n
n
u
al
 fo
r 
19
73
–9
6;
 a
n
d 
N
or
in
ch
u
ki
n
 R
es
ea
rc
h
 In
st
it
u
te
,
F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
of
 A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
, F
or
es
tr
y 
an
d
 F
is
h
er
ie
s 
in
 J
ap
an
 f
or
 1
99
7–
99
. C
ol
u
m
n
s 
3,
 4
 a
n
d 
6 
ar
e 
ob
ta
in
ed
 a
s 
re
si
du
al
s.
4
B
ec
au
se
 S
oc
ia
l A
cc
ou
n
ts
 fo
r 
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
ra
l a
n
d
 A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
-R
el
at
ed
 I
n
d
u
st
ri
es
 e
m
pl
oy
s 
a 
fi
sc
al
-y
ea
r 
ba
se
, t
h
e 
au
th
or
 c
on
ve
rt
ed
 t
h
e 
da
ta
to
 a
 c
al
en
da
r-
ye
ar
 b
as
e 
fo
r 
19
70
–7
3 
by
 a
ss
u
m
in
g 
co
lu
m
n
 8
 i
s 
co
n
st
an
t 
be
tw
ee
n
 t
h
e 
ca
le
n
da
r-
ye
ar
 e
n
d 
an
d 
th
e 
fi
sc
al
-y
ea
r 
en
d.
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1
M
ea
su
re
d 
at
 t
h
e 
en
d 
of
 t
h
e 
ca
le
n
da
r 
ye
ar
.
2
L
ia
bi
li
ti
es
 c
on
si
st
 o
f l
oa
n
s 
an
d 
tr
ad
e 
cr
ed
it
s.
  T
h
u
s,
 c
ol
u
m
n
s 
2 
an
d 
4 
in
cl
u
de
 lo
an
s 
fr
om
 fi
n
an
ci
al
 in
st
it
u
ti
on
s 
ot
h
er
 th
an
 N
ok
yo
 a
n
d 
tr
ad
e
cr
ed
it
s.
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N
ok
yo
’s
 t
ra
de
 c
re
di
ts
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 n
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-f
in
an
ci
al
 b
u
si
n
es
se
s 
ar
e 
n
ot
 e
st
im
at
ed
 b
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au
se
 o
f 
a 
la
ck
 o
f 
da
ta
.
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L
oa
n
s 
fr
om
 N
ok
yo
 t
o 
to
ta
l h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
 (c
ol
u
m
n
 5
) i
s 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d 
fr
om
 N
or
in
ch
u
ki
n
 R
es
ea
rc
h
 I
n
st
it
u
te
, F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
of
 A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
,
F
or
es
tr
y 
an
d
 F
is
h
er
ie
s 
in
 J
ap
an
. B
as
ed
 o
n
 M
A
F
F
, S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
on
 A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
ra
l C
oo
pe
ra
ti
ve
s,
 (5
) i
s 
se
pa
ra
te
d 
in
to
 lo
an
s 
to
 fa
rm
 h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
(i
.e
. 1
) 
an
d 
lo
an
s 
to
 n
on
-f
ar
m
 h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
 (
i.e
. 3
).
 F
ar
m
 h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
’ t
ot
al
 li
ab
il
it
ie
s 
(1
 +
 2
) 
is
 a
va
il
ab
le
 in
 M
A
F
F
 (
19
95
) S
oc
ia
l 
A
cc
ou
n
ts
fo
r 
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
ra
l a
n
d
 A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
-R
el
at
ed
  I
n
d
u
st
ri
es
, F
Y
19
93
 (f
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 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
re
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 a
s 
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 fo
ot
n
ot
e 
2 
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ab
le
 5
, t
h
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F
Y
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93
 d
at
a 
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e 
u
se
d
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d 
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e 
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n
t 
da
ta
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ot
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 o
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l 
h
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h
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i.e
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+6
+7
) 
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d 
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ta
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s 
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ot
al
 h
ou
se
h
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ds
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n
n
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A
ge
n
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n
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n
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h
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B
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at
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n
al
 A
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n
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 1
95
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 1
99
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d 
R
ep
or
t 
on
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at
io
n
al
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ou
n
ts
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Y
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00
 v
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si
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 C
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u
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 4
, 6
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d 
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u
la
te
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 r
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u
al
s.
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F
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 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
re
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 a
s 
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 f
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ot
e 
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 T
ab
le
 5
, d
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a 
fo
r 
co
lu
m
n
s 
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an
d 
4 
ar
e 
li
m
it
ed
 t
o 
pr
e-
19
94
 y
ea
rs
.
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B
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au
se
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A
F
F
 d
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 fi
sc
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, t
h
e 
au
th
or
 c
on
ve
rt
ed
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h
e 
da
ta
 t
o 
a 
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le
n
da
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ye
ar
 b
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ss
u
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in
g 
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m
n
 9
 is
 c
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st
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n
da
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n
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th
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fi
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ea
r 
en
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accepted a lower share of the life insurance market in order to maintain its profits from
banking. For Nokyo, collecting deposits is more profitable than selling insurance.
Another interesting finding is that Nokyo’s share of the insurance market as measured
by reserves was larger than its share as measured by premiums in the 1970s and 1980s. This
is consistent with the belief in Japan that Nokyo’s cancellation rate is much lower than that
of its rivals. This characteristic seemed to disappear in the 1990s.
Retailing of consumer goods
Nokyo operates supermarkets, called A-coops, that are just like ordinary supermarkets and are
open to both members and non-members (Figure 4).33
Supermarkets are Nokyo’s least-regulated business, and Nokyo’s market share of
supermarket sales is very low (Table 8 and Figure 8). This may be further evidence that Nokyo’s
businesses cannot be competitive unless they are given special privileges.
Table 8 Nokyo’s share in retailing of consumer goods (billion yen; per cent)
Total Nokyo Nokyo’s
sales sales share
1968 11,171 32 0.3
1970 14,480 63 0.4
1972 18,937 128 0.7
1974 27,109 222 0.8
1976 37,075 407 1.1
1979 48,221 605 1.3
1982 59,843 815 1.4
1985 65,159 985 1.5
1988 74,141 1,118 1.5
1991 88,215 1,251 1.4
1994 89,239 1,192 1.3
1997 89,786 1,072 1.2
Notes: 1 Consumer goods include general merchandise, dry goods, apparel and apparel accessories,
food and beverages, and furniture, utensils and household appliances in MITI, Census of
Commerce.
2 Nokyo’s sales for 1994 do not include dry goods, apparel and apparel accessories. For this
reason, Nokyo’s share for 1994 is an underestimate. Nokyo sales of dry goods, apparel and
apparel accessories were 3.4 billion yen in 1991 and 2.5 billion yen in 1997.
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Another interesting (and possibly counterintuitive) finding is that Nokyo’s share of the
supermarket business had been increasing until the second half of the 1980s.34  While Nokyo’s
share dropped slightly between 1988 and 1997, it is still higher than in 1976. ‘Nokyo pessimism’
is not the case in this sector, either.
Conclusion
This paper presents numerical evidence that disputes the popular view of ‘Nokyo pessimism’,
showing that Nokyo firmly maintained its economic presence until the early 1990s. Up until
this time, the government’s protection allowed Nokyo to count on stable profits from banking
and insurance. Nokyo used these profits to expand its scope and strengthen its organising
ability.
Nokyo’s economic position became less secure in the mid-1990s. The profitability of its
banking and insurance activities was seriously undermined by financial liberalisation. Facing
a harsher business environment, Nokyo implemented structural reforms in the 1990s, cutting
back employees and accelerating the consolidation of smaller unit cooperatives. Fiercer
competition in the financial industry seems inevitable in the near future, and Nokyo may be
forced to undertake more drastic restructuring.
Financial liberalisation, not the reform of Nokyo, has been the major factor that has
undermined Nokyo’s economic power. While financial liberalisation has not affected Nokyo
directly, it has seriously diminished Nokyo’s economic foundation. The cosy relations among
Nokyo, farmers, the LDP and the MAFF will decay if Nokyo loses its economic power and
therefore its organising ability. The mid-1990s should therefore be seen as the start of a slow
and steady change in Japanese agricultural policy.
Notes
1 Another reason for the lack of numerical information on Nokyo is that researchers
have been inclined to look at farming, and Nokyo’s role in farming, with nostalgia. The
author believes that researchers need to take a more rational view of Nokyo’s
activities.
2 Although most tenant farmers became owner farmers in the land reforms that took
place between 1947 and 1949 under the Allied Occupation, the size of farms did not
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change significantly because 1.0 hectares was still around the most efficient farm size
at that time.
3 For further details, see Mulgan (2000: 328–34).
4 Various administrative organs are involved in agricultural policymaking. For details,
see Mulgan (2000).
5 The Japan Socialist Party was renamed the Social Democratic Party in 1991.
6 Although one of the objectives of Prime Minister Ikeda’s income-doubling program,
announced in 1960, was the expansion in farm size to 2.5 hectares by 1970, the average
remained at around 1.0 hectares throughout the 1960s.
7 The growth of the economy has created off-farm job opportunities even in rural areas,
which would allow small farmers to exit from farming without losing income.
8 Calculated for all the prefectures excluding Hokkaido.
9 Article 1 of the 1952 Agricultural Land Law states that ‘the government understands
that owner farming is the most desirable form of farming’. The aim was to prevent the
re-emergence of the large holdings owed by powerful landlords that caused serious
income inequality in rural areas before the war. Although fears of a return to a prewar-
style tenant farming disappeared in the high-growth era, Article 1 is still in effect.
Tenancy is the most practical way of enlarging farm size because the price of land is
extremely high in Japan. While the MAFF has slowly decreased its regulations on
tenant farming since 1970, its objective is still to protect small-scale farming against
large-scale farming (see Godo 2000).
10 The MAFF’s price support policy has benefited both small and large farm operations,
but the combination of the acreage-control program and the supported rice price has
helped small-scale farming the most. Godo (1993) provides numerical evidence on this
point. A more comprehensive discussion of the acreage-control program’s economic
impact on farm structure is given in Hayami and Godo (forthcoming: ch. 9).
11 The Agricultural Land Law states that those who live ‘too far’ from farmland or who
are ‘too inexperienced’ in farming cannot become tenants (the municipal office of the
Agricultural Committee is in charge of examining the credentials of tenants). How-
ever, it is very difficult for the MAFF to uncover an illegal tenancy contract if a
farmland is rented by a secret agreement. For further information about the Agricul-
tural Land Law, see Godo (2000).
12 There are two types of unit cooperatives – specialised cooperatives (Senmon Nokyo)
and general cooperatives (Sogo Nokyo). The former are similar to Europe’s agricul-
tural cooperatives, which specialise in distributing agricultural products and purchas-
ing inputs for farming. General cooperatives provide a greater variety of services.
There are fewer specialised cooperatives than general cooperatives, so this paper
discusses only the general cooperatives (the term Nokyo is commonly viewed as
referring to the general cooperatives).
13 The MAFF has been considering deregulating its zoning regulation (Nokyo 2000: 12).
14 Most of Nokyo’s services, except lending and insurance, are accessible to non-
members, so unless a non-farm household wants to borrow money from Nokyo or buy
Nokyo’s insurance, there is no special advantage in becoming an associate member.
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15 In the 1940s Nokyo was in charge of food rationing, which is why establishing unit
cooperatives according to municipal borders made sense. As the rationing system
came to an end between 1949 and 1951, the average size of unit cooperatives proved
to be too small to be competitive with other entities.
16 Readers may not understand the term Economic Division in Figure 4, or why the
prefectural economic federations and the National Federation are so named. These are
vestiges of the 1940s, when the distribution of agricultural products and the sale of
fertiliser were Nokyo’s most important roles.
17 To promote their non-farming-related businesses, unit cooperatives have encouraged
non-farm households to join Nokyo as associate members. However, associate mem-
bers are not allowed to participate in decision-making. Although farmers allow non-
farm households to contribute to Nokyo’s profits, they keep non-farm households away
from the various pork-barrel benefits obtained from LDP politicians.
18 The Food Control Law was replaced by the New Staple Food Law in 1995. Although
many regulations on rice marketing were removed by the new law, Nokyo is still the
main distributor of rice.
19 Onodera (1974) discusses Nokyo’s dominant position in the sale of fertiliser.
20 Teranishi (1994) provides a comprehensive explanation of the government’s regula-
tion and protection of the banking industry.
21 This slogan appeared in a resolution adopted at the 12th General Meeting of Nokyo in
1970.
22 In close-knit rural communities, relationships are important when choosing a finan-
cial institution.
23 The MOF has been gradually reforming Japan’s financial markets since 1979. The
liberalisation of interest rates on small deposit accounts began in 1989 and was
completed by 1993.
24 Nokyo started to discuss such reforms as early as the 1970s but had never put them
into effect. In 1998 the National Federation merged three of the prefectural economic
federations. More mergers are expected.
25 The 18th General Meeting of Nokyo in 1998 resolved to streamline Nokyo businesses
by reducing the number of unit cooperatives to less than 1,000. The most drastic
reform took place in Nara prefecture in 1998 when all the unit cooperatives were
unified into a single cooperative called “JA Nara”. The prefectural federation and
prefectural credit federation were also merged into JA Nara.
26 There are too many articles on ‘Nokyo pessimism’ to list. A typical example is Kai
(1991).
27 The news media occasionally report entrepreneurial farmers’ criticisms of Nokyo’s
bureaucratic and inflexible business attitudes. For example, see Asahishimbun
Keizai-bu (1994).
28 Nokyo’s share of the rice market dropped in 1980 and 1993, years of extremely poor rice
harvests. Many farmers shipped rice to illegal free traders because rice prices in the
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underground market were much higher than the official trade prices (the Food Control
Law regulated rice collection before 1995).
29 Although the Food Control Law was effective until 1995, the underground rice market
gradually expanded even in the 1980s (see Godo and Hayami forthcoming, fig.7.3).
30 Nokyo’s share of personal deposits levelled off from 1987 to 1992 (column 7 of Table
5). This period coincided with the land development boom that handed farmers huge
profits when they sold farmland for non-agricultural use (Godo 2000).
31 The National Accounts also only includes these three types of life insurance institu-
tion.
32 The Economic Planning Agency uses the reserves measure in the National Accounts.
33 The Agricultural Cooperative Law stipulates that the business of non-members must
not exceed one-fifth of that of members, but this regulation is not followed in Nokyo’s
retailing business.
34 Nokyo’s rising share over this period was partly because of the expansion of purchas-
ing power in rural areas and the change in consumption toward convenience foods.
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